Agile development such as Scrum and Extreme Programming deliver so ware in short iterations for quick response to rapid business requirement and market changes. However, established secure so ware development methodologies are mostly based on linear models such as waterfall and V-model, making them unsuitable for direct application in an agile environment. is paper presents a proposal for integrating security activities into Scrum process for developing secure Web applications. We identify gaps in existing approaches to secure agile development and analyze established security engineering activities. We then adapt these activities and orchestrate them into Scrum development process to achieve both security and agility. Our proposal is evaluated by a Scrum team developing commercial JAVA EE applications in an opinion survey.
INTRODUCTION
Agile so ware development advocates short iteration cycles, early delivery, and incremental so ware development to enable so ware projects to quickly react to changes in business requirements [4] . It is fundamentally di erent from traditional linear development models such as waterfall and the V-model. Scrum is a framework of practices for agile development, in which so ware is incrementally implemented, tested, reviewed, and shipped in Sprints, usually lasted for 30 consecutive calendar days or less. Due to dynamic customer needs and the pressure on time-to-market, agile development is used extensively in Web application development.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. However, Web application has a large a ack surface and is a popular target of remote a acks on the Internet. Statistically they exhibit a track record of high number of vulnerabilities and incidents in the past [14] . Agile development makes Web application security even more challenging. Many established so ware assurance practices [5, 7, 9] are based on linear development models. e identi cation of threats and security requirements and the creation of secure so ware architectures all require a considerable amount of time, which contradicts with the principle of agile development. In an agile development, so ware is implemented in increments. It accepts the fact that requirements will o en change and hence avoids time-consuming planning phase. It also minimizes the e ort on documentation and modeling. e "agile" practices are not totally compatible with traditional so ware security practices emphasizing on careful planning, thorough analysis, and iterative design and development. Hence the main challenge of achieving Web security in Scrum process is to balance the e ciency and dynamics of agile development with security with appropriate cost-e ectiveness.
Several approaches have been proposed in the past to address secure Web application development in an agile environment, especially for Scrum [18] . A majority of existing work focus on integrating security activities into the development process or extending Scrum activities and artifacts to cover security concerns. Although Web security in Scrum is a multifaceted problem that requires solutions from many aspects, we argue that a low hanging fruit is a secure development process that can be readily integrated into existing work ow of a development team in so ware production. In this paper, we propose a secure Scrum process for Web application development. Speci cally,
• we propose a secure Scrum process that maps and integrates security engineering practices from the ISO standard Systems Security Engineering -Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), originally designed for linear development; • we propose an agile risk analysis method that balances the agility and e ectiveness of security analysis in agile development; • and we evaluate our approach with developers who use Scrum on a daily basis for commercial so ware. Our focus is on Web application, mainly because agile method is widely used in Web development. Another reason is that we have the possibility to evaluate our approach with a Scrum team developing commercial Web applications. We use OWASP top 10 security risks [15] as a benchmark for Web application security.
e goal is to reduce vulnerabilities and security bugs in Web applications developed in Scrum process. In the following, Sec.2 gives background information about Scrum followed by a discussion of related work in Sec.3. Sec.4 presents our secure Scrum process and Sec.5 evaluates our approach, followed by the conclusion in Sec.6.
OVERVIEW OF SCRUM
Scrum [18] is an agile so ware development process. A Scrum team consists of a product owner, a Scrum master, and a development team. e product owner de nes the objectives and requirements of the project and the release plan. A product backlog is used to include all de ned functional and nonfunctional requirements. e Scrum master helps the development team to follow the Scrum practices and provides coordination between the product owner and the development team. A development team ideally consists of three to nine people, with the role of implementing the so ware. All members of a team are cross-functional and equal, i.e. no strict roles such as testers or designers exist. Everyone within the team can conduct so ware design, implementation, and testing.
So ware is incrementally implemented in Sprint, initiated by a Sprint planning. It is divided into two parts. In the rst part, the product owner and the development team de ne the most important requirements that will be turned into functionality in a single Sprint. In the second part, the development team identi es the tasks necessary to transform the requirements into functionalities and plans how to actually achieve it.
e result is documented in a Sprint backlog. Every day in a Sprint, the development team holds a daily Scrum meeting that takes no more than 15 minutes to exchange and discuss progresses and problems. New items in the product backlog can be created in product backlog re nement session, held between the product owner and the development team. e session can also be used to re ne the items already in the product backlog in more details.
e time spent on product backlog re nement should not exceed 10% of the capacity of the development team. A Sprint review meeting is held at the end of the Sprint. e increment implementation is assessed according to the Sprint goals de ned in the backlog. All items in the sprint backlog should be completed at the end of a Sprint. Completeness is de ned by the "De nition of Done", which is a list of requirements to be met for the so ware increment. Items that do not obtain the status of "De nition of Done" are returned to the product backlog and re-prioritized.
User stories [2] are commonly used in Scrum practice. A user story consists of a one sentence summary of the business value and several acceptance criteria, which are wri en on a physical form, such as a sticky note. A development team de nes individual so ware increments in user stories together with its customer or the product owner. For de ning a user story, the Independent, Negotiable, Valuable, Estimable, Small, and Testable (INVEST) [1] principle is used. A user story must ful ll the "De nition of Ready" (i.e. a list of criteria to be met before a user story becomes immediately actionable) before it can be selected for a Sprint planning for later implementation. A Scrum release plan describes the plan for multiple Sprints. It is a list of requirements or user stories which should be shipped in a release.
RELATED WORK
Existing work mainly focuses on adding security activities and techniques into agile development process or extending agile activities or artifacts to cover security concerns. For example, in extreme programming (XP), an XP team must follow development practices such as simple design, testing, re-factoring, metaphor, collective ownership, coding standard and pair programming. Wäyrynen et al. [22] analyzed XP's suitability for developing secure so ware and used the SSE-CMM as a checklist for evaluating which practices are already taken into account. eir analysis shows that XP lacks support for the assessment of security risks and speci cation of security needs because security requirements are non-functional, which cannot be easily broken down into estimable tasks. erefore, security experts need to be included in XP for risk assessment and for pair programming with the development team. Microso extends its Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL) to cover agile development [13] . Although it has the potential to become another de facto industry standard, at the currently form it is only a collection of best practices recommendations.
User stories are a type of artifacts used in Scrum to de ne soware requirements and increments. Several approaches have proposed to use user stories for security in Scrum. Asthana et al. [3] proposed to use security-related user stories to identify security threats and de ne security requirements in security-related user story templates. e templates can be used for security requirements which are then divided into small manageable tasks. Tuuli et al. [19] also proposed that a product owner should write speci c security-related user stories with the help of security-related user story templates. ese stories are then implemented by the development team similar to ordinary functional ones. From a development process point of view, such an approach has the advantage of easily integrating security requirements into current activities that the developers are familiar with. Pohl and Hof [17] extended this approach in which security concerns of a functional user story is formulated as a security-related user story, misuse story, or abuse story. e concerns are linked to corresponding functional user stories in the product backlog. Hence, security concerns of a functional user story become product backlog items and are linked to functional user stories. "De nition of Done" is required to include the veri cation of security concerns. A new backlog item covering the veri cation part is added to the product backlog if veri cation fails.
Several techniques to replace time-consuming security analysis have been proposed. Vähä-Sipilä [21] proposed to use generic "security story" templates and threat modeling to identify abuse cases and threats.
e requirements are then broken down into estimable tasks and added to the product backlog. reat modeling and other security tasks are performed in Sprints and added as backlog tasks in order to allow a product owner to measure costs.
SECURE SCRUM PROCESS 4.1 Methodology
We aim at designing a secure Scrum process to achieve both agility and security in Web application development. Assuming that most security activities will introduce overhead in terms of time and additional human resource, our consideration hence focuses on what type of security activities are essential to security, what security practices brings the most bene t with the least overhead, and whether we can minimize the overhead introduced by these activities.
Inspired by [22] , we use the processes described in SSE-CMM [7] as a baseline to select and integrate a subset of the security activities for Scrum. SSE-CMM is an ISO/IEC standard for secure so ware development. It introduces security engineering practices into the development lifecycle and describes how to evaluate the capability level of such practices. We regard it as a comprehensive collection of security engineering activities to date. SSE-CMM organizes best practice security activities into 11 process areas. In order to select the security activities with the most cost-bene t in the context of Scrum, we analyze the existing security activities given in SSE-CMM and cross-check them with additional well-established secure so ware development methodologies such as NIST 800-64 [9] , Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP) [12] , Cigital Touchpoint [10] , and Microso SDL [5] to identify common denominators. Based on the analysis, we propose a secure Scrum process that integrates security-related activities, tools, and quality gates. In addition, risk analysis is an essential security activity. To reduce the overhead introduced by traditional risk analysis method, we design an agile risk analysis method to be an integral part of the secure Scrum process. A detailed discussion of these activities is given in Sec. 4.3.
Analysis of agility of existing security engineering activities
e objective of the analysis is to identify speci c activities, methods, tools, and techniques that can be integrated into a secure Scrum process. ese security activities are conducted in the phases of security requirement speci cation, so ware design, secure so ware implementation, and veri cation.
We adopt the criteria of agility given in [8] , which includes simplicity, free of modeling and documentation, tolerant to requirement changes, minimal speed of execution, people oriented, informality, iterative, and high exibility.
e original de nition is abstract. We extend the criteria with more details. For example, "simplicity" for us means to ask "what kind of security expertise must the person have in order to complete it in an e ective way?", "tolerant to requirement changes" means "is it necessary to wait for the completion of other activities in order to be able to complete an activity?" and "how much has to be redone on small or medium requirement changes?" We interpret "high exibility" as "is it possible to skip some steps without being ine ective, due to, for example, time reasons? Can these steps be replaced by other ones which are more e cient? Should all steps be performed strictly as described to be e ective?"
To quantitatively measure the agility of each of the activities, we de ne a metrics in which each aforementioned element of agility is further given a value in the scale from 0 to 5. For example, for "simplicity", 0 means the least simple and 5 means the most simple. We assume it will take on average 2 weeks to implement a user story in Scrum sprint. Hence 0 for "speed of execution" means it will last for the whole Sprint, and 5 means that it will only last 1-2 hours. Since there are 8 elements, the highest score an activity can get is 5 × 8 = 40. We arbitrarily de ne if an activity receives more than 21 points (above 50%) it is "agile compatible". We also regard an activity to "agile friendly" if it receives more than 26 points (above 67%). Note that the decision on the cut-o values is intended to gain relative measures of agility.
We review the security activities speci ed in NIST 800-64, SREP, Cigital Touchpoint, and Microso SDL and evaluate them against the 8 elements of agility. Our evaluation identi es 7 activities that have the scores quali ed to be "agile friendly", i.e. security requirements analysis, role matrix, static analysis, dynamic analysis, code review, initiate security planning, and conduct testing. Moreover, we also identi ed another 7 activities that quali ed to be "agile compatible", i.e. a ack surface analysis, abuse cases, penetration testing, critical assets, repository improvement, categorize information system, and assess privacy impact. Interested readers are referred to the corresponding original documents for detailed background information.
A proposal for secure Scrum process
e secure Scrum process is a collection of security activities organized in a balanced way for both security and agility. For security, our rationale is to integrate the security activities identi ed as "agile". Our rst step is to group these activities into requirement, design, implementation and veri cation phase similar to a waterfall model. en we adapt these activities to be used in the secure Scrum process. A description of our adaptation of these security activities is given below.
Requirement.
In Initiate Security Planning, the so ware company discusses with the stakeholders of the project about security policies and high-level security requirements. Security visions and roles are de ned. e participants should obtain a basic knowledge of security expectations. e meeting should be documented and a provisional schedule and milestones should be de ned. e goal ofAgile Risk Analysis: External Dependencies is to de ne the deployment environment and security assumptions. Security assumptions should be linked to corresponding security-related user stories. Security Requirement Analysis identi es security requirements and documents them in the security section of the user stories or epics (i.e. a work that takes longer than a week or a full Sprint to complete). Furthermore, possible a ack scenarios can be added to the user stories. Note that it is assumed that not all security requirements and a ack scenarios can be determined in this stage. It obtains a high-level understanding of security requirements. Security requirements are kept as acceptance criteria in functional user stories. Agile Risk Analysis: Identify Trust Level identi es all users who have access rights to the application. It also creates a acker pro les and establishes a high-level understanding of application access. Agile Risk Analysis: Identify Assets lists all assets categorized by trust levels. e information is stored with their impact levels. Agile Risk Analysis: Determine Entry Points identi es unnecessary user accesses to the assets described in the user story.
4.3.2 Design. Agile Risk Analysis: Identify reats identi es concrete threats in the context of a speci c user story. Highlevel threats identi ed in previous steps are analyzed to determine whether they are speci c enough for a story. For each identi ed threat, a security-related user story and abuse cases are de ned and a ached to the functional user story. In Agile Risk Analysis: Ranking of reats with DREAD, the results are presented to the team in another product backlog re nement meeting. e product owner should discuss with the whole team about the impact of each threat. e Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, A ected users, Discoverability (DREAD) [11] method can be used for ranking threats. If the ranking cannot be completed for a user story, it will not obtain a "De nition of Ready". Hence, the user story has to be re ned again in another product backlog re nement meeting. In Agile Risk Analysis: Mitigation Strategies, security controls are chosen to each threat as mitigation strategies in a product backlog re nement meeting and documented in the corresponding security-related user stories.
Implementation.
In Document Security Controls, the developers tailor the high-level security controls to t for a speci c user story. ey describe the reason for the design decision for a speci c security control in the corresponding security-related user story.
e documentation should be a short formal description. Static Code Analysis requires each developer to perform security vulnerability scans with static code analysis tools over their code. If issues are found in the code, a security bug is immediately reported to a bug tracking system, such as Jira. Dynamic Code Analysis uses approved dynamic code analysis tool for frequently testing of the so ware. We recommend Pair Programming for security-critical so ware components, i.e. one developer writes the code whereby the other one looks for coding failures or security aws at the same time. It means that at lease on developer has su cient security expertise to recognize security aws. In every Sprint, Dependency Checker tools are used in order to check if libraries contain publicly-known security vulnerabilities. In case of insecure libraries, a security bug is reported to a bug tracking system. If libraries with known issues are used, it is documented why it is not possible to use another library or whether the known issues are relevant.
Verification.
Veri cation should be risk-based. Agile risk analysis should be used to prioritize the de nition of test cases and reviews according to the risks. In Pair Penetration Testing, a quality engineer with the developer who generated the code should test the program using a black box Web vulnerability scanner. If possible, only the new implemented functionality should be tested with this tool. If the result contains false positives, all false positives should be documented and explained why they are not security aws. e result is used to speed up testing in penetration testing. In Penetration Testing, a penetration tester tests various a ack scenarios either manually or automatically with all-in-one penetration testing tools.
e penetration tester should use the list of false positives from the previous activity to avoid exploiting the same vulnerabilities. Issues detected are prioritized with DREAD and handled in the activity Agile Risk Analysis: Mitigation Strategies. In Code Review, a security tester performs a security code review with the developer for the user story. In this review they manually review the source code to identify security aws.
Besides these activity groups, quality gates are used in the development process to describe milestones and to evaluate whether all obligatory criteria are ful lled as the condition for proceeding to the next phase. ality gates are placed between phases. As an existing mechanism in Scrum for quality control, it provides an opportunity for security-related reviews.
4.3.5 Secure Scrum. Fig. 1 shows the components of a secure Scrum process and Fig. 2 gives an overview of our proposed secure Scrum process. e process is based on Scrum speci cation and the aforementioned security activities that we regard as agile enough to be integrated into the process. In the gure, standard Scrum practices (shown as green boxes) are extended with security activities (highlighted in red rectangles). We adopt the principle of Scrum release planning, which is a date-or feature-driven plan for multiple Sprints including a list of requirements or user stories to be shipped in a release [6] . We assume that a so ware company ships around four releases in a year. Each release consists of four Sprints and each one is performed in the time-span of two weeks. Note that in reality, there will be many variations in these numbers from company to company.
Figure 1: Components of secure Scrum process
We assume that a security specialist is needed to cooperate with the customer, product owner and the development team for security requirement analysis.
Besides the activities already described, addition considerations in the secure Scrum process are given below.
• Requirement. In current release n, the requirement phase of the next release n + 1 starts. In other words, in the last two Sprints of a release, the epics and user stories of the next release are planned. At the same time, high-level security requirements, trust levels, possible assets, and their entry points are identi ed. e results are included in a security section of the epics or user stories of release n + 1.
• Design. In the design phase, security-related technical user stories are identi ed. Product backlog re nement meetings are held in Scrum to evaluate whether user stories or epics have been changed so they can be re ned. Security requirements are considered in these meetings. New threats are identi ed when a functional user story is implemented. ese threats are then formulated into security-related user stories.
e quality gate "De nition of Ready" makes it mandatory. us only if all activities of the requirement and design phase for a user story have been completed, this user story is allowed to be added to the Sprint backlog and the implementation of it can be started.
• Implementation. It is similar to normal Scrum. A er user stories have been added to a Scrum team s Sprint backlog, the stories are implemented. Security control are added to the Scrum process in the context of a user story and documented in the corresponding security-related user story. If no security controls have been developed, the reasons are documented in the corresponding securityrelated user story.
• Veri cation. Stories are tested with pair penetration testing, code reviews, whitebox security testing, and penetration testing. Security testing are based on the outcome of the agile risk analysis to prioritize the test cases and reviews with regard to their risks. A er these activities have been successfully performed, the "De nition of Done" is ful lled by the user story or epic. A Scrum retrospective meeting is held together with the Sprint review. A er these meetings, user stories which obtained the "De nition of Done" are shipped to the customer just like in normal Scrum.
In order to integrate security requirements in a Scrum process, it is necessary to de ne and document them. We adopt the securityrelated user story templates from SAFECode [3] . However, a development team should re ne the templates for its speci c functional user stories. Each of the security-related user stories receives a security debt value and is added to the Product Backlog. A debt value is a numeric value used as a mechanism to force and track a development team to implement certain security requirements speci ed in the security-related user stories. If a team does not develop the security user stories in a Sprint, the security debt value of these stories is added to the teams security debt. A security debt threshold is arbitrary de ned by the team. If the debt value exceeds a certain threshold, the team must develop these security-related user stories in a separate Sprint. Security-critical user stories can also be added as an acceptance criteria. References should be added to link security-related user story to corresponding functional user stories as suggested in [17] .
Agile risk analysis
Most existing risk analysis and threat modeling methodologies were originally developed for linear models and lack a certain degree of "agile friendliness. Nevertheless, security risk analysis and threat modeling is essential for so ware security. erefore, we adapt the OWASP Application reat Modeling (OATM) [16] and propose a risk analysis methodology tailored to agile development. We use OATM as a reference and remove and modify some of the activities, and replace some steps with agile friendly activities.
e result is based on the agile friendly activities whereas it still covers the basic process areas in SSE-CMM for secure development. Specically, the PAs considered are Assess Impact, Assess Security Risk, Assess reat, and Assess Vulnerability. It consists of the following activities: Abuse cases, Role Matrix, Critical Assets, A ack Surface Analysis/Reduction, Categorize Information System. A description of the activities are given below.
• External dependencies and security assumptions-De ne security assumptions and a ach a link in the user stories. Use so ware dependency checker in every Sprint to nd vulnerabilities in libraries that are used in a project.
• Asset. Identify the assets in a so ware and the user with access to them. A comprehensive identi cation of asset is based on either interviews with asset owners and stakeholders or functional requirements. Importance of assets can be ranked based on existing impact assessment matrix [20] . A table or database can be used to store and track all assets depending on the size of the project.
• Trust levels. Identify trust level of each of the user in which a matrix is used to clear identify which user is allowed for what kind of access (create, read, write, or execute) to each asset. It should be linked to user stories too.
• Entry Points. Identify entry points of potential a acks by using a ack surface analysis activity [5] .
• reat identi cation. Brainstorming instead of threat analysis based on data ow diagram (DFD) typically used in reat modeling is used. reats are identify using securityrelated user story templates from Safecode [3] . ese templates were created to support the formalization of security requirements in an agile development process. e simpli cation should signi cantly improve the agility of this step. Speci c a ack scenarios are mapped to abuse cases with the help of the OWASP Top10 document. ese abuse cases should be formulated either formally or with the help of diagrams, which can be developed fast and should be a ached to the corresponding security-related user story.
is means that a security-related user story can contain one or more abuse cases.
e goal is to identify further threats and to support the writing of speci c test cases.
• reat ranking. Ranking of threats using Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, A ected users, Discoverability (DREAD).
• Mitigation strategy. Design and implement mitigation following a set of strategies such as do nothing, remove the feature, turn o the feature, warn the user, implement security controls, or transfer the risks [16] .
EVALUATION
We evaluate the secure Scrum proposal in two aspects: 1) the agility and cost-e ectiveness of our proposal in terms of additional time to normal Scrum process, 2) the level of security it provides.
Evaluation of agility and cost-e ectiveness
For the rst aspect, we conducted a survey on a group of employees at a medium size so ware company using a questionnaire. e company develops commercial Java EE web applications for large corporate customers and follows the Scrum process. We explained the interviewee in an one hour presentation of the whole secure Scrum process and described each of its activities. A er the presentation, we ask them to ll out a questionnaire on how agile and cost-e ective they think each activity is. We also asked them how much time they would invest for completing each activity in the context of a user story. A group of ten people with mixed roles are involved in the survey, which includes four developers, two Scrum masters, one so ware architect, one project manager, one quality manager, and one product owner. e interviewees are selected based on the criterion that they are able to estimate the time, cost, and agility of a Scrum process from their speci c perspectives. Fig. 3 shows the median scores of all participants' answers. e time column displays how much time in hours the participants would spent in average to complete an activity. Note that the estimation on pair programming time is skipped, because we think that it is not possible for them to estimate the additional e ort. e cost and agility columns illustrate the participants' median scores in regard to cost and agility to average out the subjective opinions.
e maximum value in these columns is ve, which represents that all participants have agreed that the activity is very agile. However, in contrast, if the value is one, all participants hold the belief that this activity is not agile-friendly. We use the following scale:
(1-1.49=very low, 1.5-2.49=low, 2.5-3.49=medium, 3.5-4.49=high, 4.5-5 = very high) In summary, based on the evaluation of a group of developers, Scrum masters, so ware architects, project managers, quality managers, and product owners on the scale of "very low", "low", "medium", "high", and "very high", our secure Scrum process is regarded as "medium" agile and "medium" cost-e ective. Furthermore, most participants agreed that security-related user stories should be added as product and Scrum backlog items.
Evaluation of security maturity level
e proposed secure Scrum process should be aligned with the SSE-CMM as a baseline for secure development process. In our approach, the secure Scrum process should take the Process Areas (PAs) of SSE-CMM into account. Fig. 4 illustrates how the Secure Scrum process handles the di erent PAs. We exclude PA 01 and 08, because they do not focus on the implementation and veri cation of secure so ware. To coordinate security we use the events of Scrum and the frequent face-to-face interactions (cf. Fig. 2 ). We use our agile risk analysis to achieve the goals of PA 02-05. In this methodology we identify threats and vulnerabilities of the implemented so ware, assess the impact on assets and calculate the actual security risk with DREAD. Static-and dynamic code analysis as well as code reviews detect further vulnerabilities. In order to assure that the so ware is really what the customer wants (part of PA 06 and PA 10) in regard of security we involve the customer in de ning the security milestones in the "Initiate Security Planning activity and in the "Security Requirement Analysis activity. In this way, it is assured that the requirements re ect the customers wishes. In order to identify proper security control alternatives to satisfy the security requirements de ned (PA 09), we conduct our agile risk analysis and use SAFECode's security-related user story templates, which list several tasks to be considered if a functionality is implemented. In the "Document Security Controls activity we select speci c security controls and implement them. Finally, in order to assure that the selected security controls actually ful ll the security requirements de ned (PA 06 and PA 11) we perform Pair Penetration Testing, Penetration Testing, Static Code Analysis, Code Review, and whitebox security testing. Additionally, we add one Security Risk Specialist and a Security Tester to each Scrum team and involve them in several security engineering activities in order to spread security knowledge among all developers.
CONCLUSION
Agile development such as Scrum is very popular among Web application developers. However, many existing secure development methodologies rely on time-consuming security practices, which contradicts the agile and incremental nature of Scrum. In this paper, we proposed a secure Scrum process that integrates proven secure development practices into agile Scrum process. We analyzed well-known secure development approaches and adapt the security activities to t into agile development. e proposed secure Scrum process has been evaluated by a group of so ware developers in an opinion survey. Our result shows that on the scale of "very low", "low", "medium", "high", and "very high", our secure Scrum process is regarded as "medium" agile and "medium" cost-e ective. We align our secure Scrum process to the Process Areas in Systems Security Engineering -Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) to ensure security. Our secure Scrum process covers all desired process areas (PAs) of SSE-CMM. We also proposed an agile risk analysis method as a trade-o between agility and security for threat identi cation.
